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1. Introduction1
The risk-adjusted cost of capital is a key input in any financial decision of rational2
managers. Its level affects the net present value of payoffs from any corporate investment3
project, from hiring decisions to capital expenditures, investment in inventories, advertising,4
and research and development. The risk-adjusted cost of capital of any firm depends on the5
firm’s quantity of risk and its aggregate price. This paper focuses on the time-variation in6
the aggregate price of risk. We document regular shifts in the risk return trade-off over the7
course of one hundred years of U.S. data and a half century of OECD data.8
This paper provides new historical evidence from U.S. and foreign securities markets9
documenting large increases in the market price of aggregate risk during recessions. A U.S.10
equity investor, who buys securities one to five quarters into a recession or expansion —11
as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) — and holds them for12
one year, earns an average excess return of 11.3% in recessions, compared to only 5.3%13
in expansions, in the post-war sample examined (1945.1 – 2009.12). Sharpe ratios, which14
correspond to average excess returns divided by their standard deviations and thus represent15
a market compensation per unit of risk, are counter-cyclical: the post-war realized Sharpe16
ratio is on average 0.66 in recessions compared to 0.38 in expansions. In addition, the17
variation in the realized excess returns and Sharpe ratios during recessions (expansions) is18
equally substantial. Sharpe ratios reach a maximum of 0.82 four quarters into a recession19
and a minimum of 0.14 three quarters into an expansion.20
The findings imply that, even in the absence of any other frictions in internal or external21
capital markets, unconstrained firms that maximize shareholder value have to use much22
higher risk-adjusted costs of capital when choosing investment projects during recessions,23
compared to expansions, if these projects are exposed to some aggregate risk. For a one-year24
project with the same aggregate risk exposure as the U.S. stock market, the risk-adjusted25
cost of capital in the middle of an expansion would be at least 9 percentage points lower26
than in the middle of a recession. As a result, financially-unconstrained firms may reject lots27
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of seemingly ‘good’ projects in recessions to avoid destroying shareholder value. Conversely,28
in expansions, firms may accept lots of seemingly ‘bad’ projects.29
The findings are robust to different frequencies, different sub-samples, and different coun-30
tries. Samples start either in 1854, 1925, or 1945, and end either in 1944 or 2009; estimates31
use either quarterly returns and quarterly recession dates, or monthly returns and monthly32
dates; and business cycles are dated thanks to the NBER or OECD economic turning points.33
In all time frames examined, equity Sharpe ratios increase during recessions and decrease34
during expansions. The findings pertain to a very limited number of observations: the35
NBER has identified only 32 cycles since 1854 in the U.S. However, foreign countries offer36
additional observations. Using the OECD turning points to date peaks and troughs, similar37
business cycle variations in the conditional Sharpe ratio on equity appear in all G7 countries38
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, and US). Again, the conditional equity Sharpe39
ratio increases during recessions and decreases during expansions.40
In contrast to previous studies, financial variables are not used to predict asset returns.41
Instead, returns are only conditioned on the stage of the business cycle, determined ex-42
clusively by non-financial variables. Thus, the investment strategy described so far is not43
implementable because investors do not know NBER recession dates in real time. Hence, the44
question remains whether the variation in returns truly measures variation in expected re-45
turns, or whether it is a variation in expected cash flows mislabeled as discount rate variation.46
To answer this key question, four additional experiments are conducted.47
First, evidence from newspaper articles and Internet searches shows that investors seem48
to learn about changes in the aggregate state of the U.S. economy rather quickly. The49
occurrence of the word “recession” in The New York Times and The Washington Post since50
1980 is informative: it takes only two months for such an index to increase by one standard51
deviation above its expansion-implied mean. The number of Google Insight searches of the52
word “recession” is available on a shorter sample, but it shows a clear increase at the end of53
2007, well before the NBER announcement of the start of the Great Recession.54
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Second, two different quasi real-time measures of business cycles lead to similar equity55
returns: the Chauvet and Piger’s (2008) real-time recession probabilities and the Chicago56
Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI). Investment strategies built on these quasi-real-time57
recession dates deliver substantial differences in average excess returns between recessions58
and expansions. In all cases, the average excess returns and the Sharpe ratios in the midst59
of recessions are larger than those measured in the midst of expansions.60
Third, changes in expected returns during business cycle expansions and contractions are61
not related to changes in expected near-term dividend growth. The variance decomposition62
of the dividend yield offers a useful tool to assess cash flow predictability because the dividend63
yield is driven exclusively by news about either future returns or dividend growth. In the64
data, dividend-yield variation is more informative about returns in the subsequent year65
during recessions than during normal times: a 1% increase in the dividend yield raises the66
expected return by 56 basis points (bps) in recessions, compared to only 17 bps in expansions.67
This finding is consistent with a decrease in the persistence of risk premia during recessions.68
The dividend yield, however, is not more informative about future dividend growth during69
recessions. We find no empirical evidence that the simple investment strategy based on70
business cycle dates is really capturing cash flow variation.71
Fourth, a set of simulations from a simple toy model shows that the investment strategy72
based on business cycle dates does not mechanically drive the results.3 If excess returns and73
output or consumption growth are perfectly correlated and the NBER defines a peak as a74
period followed by low growth, then the methodology would suffer from a severe look-ahead75
bias: the simple investment strategy would automatically deliver low excess returns at the76
start of recessions. Excess returns, however, exhibit a low correlation with consumption77
growth. In this case, simulations show that the look-ahead bias is limited, even if consump-78
tion growth is persistent.79
3A detailed description of the simulations is available in a separate Online Appendix, along with the
published paper on Science Direct.
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We show that expected returns to stocks, adjusted for volatilities, are higher in recessions80
than in expansions in the U.S. and other OECD countries under feasible trading strategies81
that start shortly after turning points and involve holding periods of up to one year. Such82
changes in expected returns during business cycle expansions and contractions are not ex-83
plained away by changes in near-term dividend growth rates.84
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some evidence that85
agents in the economy can detect changes in the business cycle environment rather quickly86
and defines “real-time” recession dates. Section 3 shows that realized and expected excess87
returns are higher on average during recessions than expansions. Section 4 focuses on the88
dynamics of excess returns and Sharpe ratios during recessions and expansions. Section 589
disentangles the cash flow and risk premium effects. Section 6 reviews the literature. Section90
7 concludes. A detailed Appendix is available online on the Science Direct website.91
2. How to Identify Recessions?92
Recessions and expansions are commonly defined in the U.S. and other OECD countries93
using the NBER and OECD methodologies.94
2.1. NBER and OECD Business Cycle Dates95
The NBER was founded in 1920 and published its first business cycle dates in 1929. Dur-96
ing the period 1961-1978, the U.S. Department of Commerce embraced the NBER turning97
points as the official record of U.S. business cycle activity, but the NBER made no formal98
announcements when it determined the dates of turning points. The Business Cycle Dating99
Committee was created in 1978, and since then there has been a formal process of announcing100
the NBER determination of a peak or trough in economic activity.4101
The NBER defines a recession as a significant decline in economic activity spread across102
the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real Gross Domestic Prod-103
4Those announcement dates were: June 3, 1980 for the January 1980 peak; July 8, 1981 for the July 1980
trough; January 6, 1982 for the July 1981 peak; July 8, 1983 for the November 1982 trough; April 25, 1991
for the July 1990 peak; December 22, 1992 for the March 1991 trough; November 26, 2001 for the March
2001 peak; July 17, 2003 for the November 2001 trough; and December 1, 2008 for the December 2007 peak.
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uct (GDP), real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. A104
recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy105
reaches its trough. Between trough and peak, the economy is in an expansion. Importantly,106
the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee states that it does not consider financial vari-107
ables when choosing peaks and troughs, even though its members have undeniably observed108
asset prices when choosing peaks and troughs and could have been influenced by these prices.109
To determine peaks and troughs, the OECD built on the NBER approach. Bry and110
Boschan (1971) have formalized the guidelines used by the NBER and incorporated them111
into a computer program. This routine is used for each OECD country. Its main input112
is the Industrial Production index (IP) covering all industry sectors excluding construction.113
This series is used because of its cyclical sensitivity and monthly availability, while the broad-114
based GDP is used to supplement the IP series for identification of the final reference turning115
points in the growth cycle. The OECD does not consider financial variables when choosing116
peaks and troughs. Moreover, the mechanical nature of the OECD procedure precludes the117
possibility that these turning points are chosen to match asset price fluctuations.118
Clearly, the NBER and the OECD announce peaks and troughs with a delay. But the119
media and Internet searches suggest that investors learn about the aggregate state of the120
economy before the NBER and OECD announcements.121
2.2. Real-Time Information122
The most obvious way to get a broad sense of the business cycle environment is by123
reading print and online offerings. The upper panel of Figure 1 reports the occurrence of124
the word “recession” in The New York Times and The Washington Post, along with NBER125
business cycle dates, over the last thirty years. At the start of each recession, there is a126
marked increase in the recession index. These changes are large and obvious. It takes only127
two months for the index to increase by one standard deviation above its expansion-implied128
mean. The second spike tends to come towards the end of the recessions, presumably because129
there is debate about the end of a recession. Moreover, the NBER announcement of the peak130
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(and hence the start of the recession), denoted as black bars, sparks many articles with the131
word “recession,” and these announcements tend to occur up to 12 months after peaks. In132
addition, the recession index decreases dramatically in the first quarters after the trough,133
suggesting that agents realize rather quickly that the economy is no longer in a recession.134
As is clear from Figure 1, the NBER announcement of a trough is typically preceded by a135
large drop in the recession index.136
[Figure 1 about here.]137
The number of Google Insight searches of the word “recession” points to the same con-138
clusion. The lower panel of Figure 1 reports how many searches have been done for the139
term “recession,” relative to the total number of searches done on Google over time. These140
numbers do not represent absolute search volume numbers, because the data are normalized141
and presented on a scale from 0 to 100. These counts are only available starting in 2004, but142
they illustrate clearly that recessions are common knowledge well before the NBER or OECD143
announcements. Figure 1 shows a huge spike in the Google search of the word “recession”144
in the U.S. in the last weeks of December 2007 and first weeks of January 2008. It actually145
became one of the most common searches on Google, more than one year before the NBER146
officially announced that the U.S. recession started in December 2007.147
As investors learn about incoming recessions, they should rebalance their portfolios out148
of equity and into bond assets. High-frequency and long-term data on portfolio holdings149
are not available, but recent data on mutual funds flows suggest that investors indeed sell150
equity at the start of recessions and buy bonds. The Online Appendix reports the monthly151
net flows into U.S. long-term equity and bond mutual funds, as collected by the Investment152
Company Institute since 1984. Massive net outflows out of equity mutual funds occur at the153
start of the 2007–2009 recession. Net inflows in fixed income funds drop in the fall of 2008154
and then largely rebound. There is thus some evidence that investors learn progressively155
about the state of the economy. They are not the only ones trying to figure out business156
cycles.157
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2.3. Mechanical Recession Rules158
Evaluating the state of the economy in real time is a challenge that has sparked the159
interest of investors, many academics, and central bankers. To address this challenge, a160
large literature tests the mechanical rules for real-time assessments of where the economy161
stands in relation to the business cycle. Some authors, building on the work of Hamilton162
(1989) (see Hamilton (2011) for a recent survey), estimate Markov-switching models using163
a small set of macroeconomic variables. Others, building on the work of Stock and Watson164
(1999), rely on large sets of macroeconomic and financial variables. We focus here on the two165
most successful attempts: Chauvet and Piger’s (2008) real-time recession probabilities and166
the Chicago Fed index; both series are publicly available at a monthly frequency starting in167
1967.168
Real-time recession probabilities are available on the website of Jeremy Piger at the169
University of Oregon. They are obtained using a real-time data set of coincident monthly170
variables and a parametric Markov-switching dynamic-factor model. The methodology is171
described in Chauvet and Piger (2008), along with a detailed comparison of the implied172
business cycle dates and the NBER recession dates. Recession dates follow two simple rules:173
(1) a recession occurs when the recession probability is above 80% for three consecutive174
months, or (2) a recession occurs when the recession probability increases above 60% and175
lasts until the probability decreases below 30%. Both rules have been proposed in the176
literature.177
The Chicago Fed index is a weighted average of 85 monthly indicators of national eco-178
nomic activity. The economic indicators are drawn from four broad categories of data: (1)179
production and income (23 series), (2) employment, unemployment, and hours (24 series),180
(3) personal consumption and housing (15 series), and (4) sales, orders, and inventories (23181
series). None of the 85 components comes from equity or bond markets. Since January 2001,182
the Chicago Fed updates the index every month and sometimes re-estimates past values. Yet,183
vintage series, which are available on the Chicago Fed’s website, are used in this paper to184
8
be as close as possible to real-time estimates. Recession dates as used by the Chicago Fed185
follow two simple rules: (1) a recession occurs when the index is below -0.7, (2) a recession186
starts when the index falls below -0.7 and ends when the index increases above 0.2. Finally,187
the information in the recession probabilities combined with the Chicago Fed index delivers188
another set of business cycle dates: a recession starts when the index is less than -0.7 and the189
probability above 60%; the recession ends when the index is above 0.2 and the probability190
below 30%. The Online Appendix reports the start and end of each recession according to191
these rules, along with NBER dates.192
These rules are not perfectly “real-time” for three reasons. First, recession probabilities193
and indices were built after important econometric work that was certainly not known at194
the beginning of our sample. Second, in the case of the Chicago Fed index, the rule does195
not use vintage data prior to January 2001 (i.e., the first release of the index). Third, even196
if their estimation does not rely on NBER dates, these rules reflect the efforts of many197
researchers to propose business cycle dates that are as close as possible to the NBER dates.198
Nonetheless, the evidence from newspaper archives, Internet searches, portfolio rebalancing,199
and mechanical dates all point in the same direction: economic agents appear able to detect200
business cycle turning points that are close to the official dates and most of the time they do201
so before the actual NBER and OECD announcements. The behavior of asset prices across202
business cycles shows that knowing the state of the economy is key.203
3. Measuring Variation in Returns from Recessions to Expansions204
A simple description of average equity excess returns in each three-month period follow-205
ing the NBER-defined recession and expansion dates already shows clear differences across206
business cycles; they become even stronger when the investment horizon increases to one207
year. On average, realized excess returns are higher during recessions than during expan-208
sions. This is true when recessions are defined with NBER dates, as well as with real-time209
recession rules.210
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3.1. Quarterly Realized Returns Across Business Cycles211
Equity returns are obtained from the value-weighted index of the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ212
markets compiled by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), while risk-free rates213
correspond to returns on Treasury bill indices compiled by Global Financial Data. Table 1214
describes the average realized returns across business cycles: it presents the average stock215
market excess returns in each three-month period following the NBER peaks (left panel) and216
troughs (right panel), but does not include investments that start right at peaks or troughs.217
The table does not take into account the specific length of each recession or expansion: it218
simply reports excess returns in each of the five quarters that follow peaks and troughs. Data219
are monthly and the samples are 1925.12 – 2009.12, 1945.1 – 2009.12, and 1854.1 – 2009.12.220
[Table 1 about here.]221
The standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping, using only the quarter under study222
(e.g., all first quarters after peaks): for each set of returns, 500 samples are built by drawing223
with replacement. This bootstrapping procedure thus takes as given the recession and ex-224
pansion periods but captures the uncertainty stemming from the small samples of realized225
excess returns.226
On average, excess returns are higher during recessions than expansions in the post-World227
War II samples, but not in the other samples. Excess returns tend to increase during reces-228
sions and decrease during expansions, but the short, one-quarter investment period implies229
lots of variation from one quarter to the next and no clear finding. A longer investment230
period of one-year delivers much stronger results.231
3.2. Average One-Year Realized Returns are Higher in Recessions232
A one-year investment exhibits clear business cycle frequencies. In expansions (reces-233
sions), one-year investors buy the stock market index in the n-th three-month period after234
the NBER trough (peak) and sell it one year later. Table 2 reports summary statistics on235
the one-year investments.236
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[Table 2 about here.]237
In the 1925.12–2009.12 sample, realized equity excess returns are equal to 9.1% during238
recessions and 5.7% during expansions. These averages are obtained by considering all the239
possible one-year investments that follow peaks and troughs (i.e., n = 1, 2, ..., and 5). The240
difference between these two averages corresponds to approximatively two standard errors.241
However, realized equity returns are more volatile during recessions than expansions. This242
is consistent with previous results in the literature (see Schwert (1989) and Kandel and243
Stambaugh (1990)). But, despite this change in volatility, realized equity Sharpe ratios are244
higher during recessions: 0.45 vs. 0.35.245
The 1945.1–2009.12 sample delivers similar results: during this period, the countercycli-246
cal nature of realized returns and Sharpe ratios is even stronger than in the previous sample.247
Realized equity excess returns are equal to 11.3% during recessions and 5.3% during ex-248
pansions. The difference between these two averages corresponds to approximatively three249
standard errors. Sharpe ratios are 0.66 during recessions and 0.38 during expansions.250
Only the longest sample delivers excess returns that seem on average pro-cyclical. As251
shown in the next section, the pattern in Sharpe ratios inside each phase of the business252
cycle is similar in the long sample as in the others, and most of the difference is due to the253
length of recessions in each sample.254
3.3. Sample Selection Bias255
Overall, the first set of results shows a large difference between average realized excess256
returns during recessions and expansions. This variation, however, cannot be directly in-257
terpreted as time-varying risk premia (i.e., expected excess returns) because of a simple258
selection bias.259
Investors do not perfectly know the state of the economy in real time. Instead, they assign260
a probability pt,t+1 to the recession state of the world being realized at t+1: pt,t+1 is thus the261
probability – estimated at date t – that the economy will be in a recession at date t+ 1. As262
new information becomes available, investors revise their estimates. During periods that are263
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ex post identified as recessions, as new information becomes available, investors gradually264
learn that the economy is in a recession and pt,t+1 converges to one. By conditioning on265
recessions, we focus only on those sample paths for which pt,t+1 actually converges to one.266
This creates a sample selection bias.267
Suppose that the recession risk premium is higher than the expansion risk premium.268
During the first quarters of periods that were ex post identified as actual recessions, we269
expect to see price declines and hence negative realized equity returns, as pt,t+1 increases270
to 1. However, we ignore those sample paths in which pt,t+1 did not subsequently decrease.271
Hence, the sample averages of realized excess returns will understate the expected excess272
returns initially during recessions, provided that the true risk premium increases during273
recessions. Similarly, during the first quarters of periods that were ex post identified as274
actual expansions, we expect to see price increases and hence positive realized equity returns,275
as pt,t+1 increases to 0. Hence, the sample averages of realized equity excess returns will276
overstate the expected excess returns initially during expansions, provided that the true risk277
premium declines during expansion.278
In the data, average realized equity excess returns are higher during recessions than279
expansions. The sample bias implies that realized equity excess returns will understate280
(overstate) the expected excess returns at the onset of recessions (expansions). As a result,281
the difference in expected excess returns between recessions and expansions is likely to be282
larger than the difference in average realized excess returns reported in Table 2.283
3.4. What About Expected Returns?284
Expected excess returns can actually be approximated with real-time recession dates in285
hand, computed from recession probabilities and the Chicago Fed index, and following the286
same investment strategy as above. The difference is that these returns are much closer to287
achievable; the investment strategy is almost implementable in real-time. Tables 3 and 4288
report the results.289
[Table 3 about here.]290
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[Table 4 about here.]291
To establish a benchmark, Panel I of Table 3 summarizes the returns obtained with292
the NBER dates for the 1967.1–2009.12 period. Even on this short period, average returns293
are clearly higher during recessions than expansions: 4.9% vs. 2.1%. Due to the short294
sample size though, standard errors are quite large — up to 3.5%. But for all the dating295
procedures considered, equity excess returns are higher on average during recessions than296
during expansions, and for many of them, the difference in risk premia is actually larger than297
the difference in realized excess returns obtained with NBER dates.298
Panels II and III of Table 3 report results using real-time recession probabilities. Using299
a simple rule with a single cutoff level, the average return is 11.4% in recessions compared300
to 4.8% in expansions. The difference is about two standard errors. Applying the two-301
cutoff rule, the average is 6.5% in recessions compared to 2.4% in expansions. In this case,302
the difference is only one standard error. Panels I and II of Table 4 report results using303
the Chicago Fed index. Using the one-cutoff rule, the average equity excess return is 7.0%304
in recessions compared to 4.5% in expansions. Using the two-cutoff rule, it is 4.5% vs.305
3.3%. When combining both recession probabilities and the Chicago Fed index (see Panel306
III in Table 4), average equity returns are equal to 6.4% during recessions vs 2.4% during307
expansions. They translate into Sharpe ratios that are mildly countercyclical: high during308
recessions (0.39) and lower during expansions (0.17).309
Recession probabilities and coincident indices suggest that agents are able to figure out310
the state of the economy well in advance of NBER announcements. If that is the case, then311
the realized excess returns are measures of expected excess returns, and thus risk premia.312
Such risk premia are clearly on average higher during recessions than expansions. We now313
show that these average returns hide some even larger dynamics along business cycles.314
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4. Investor Returns During Recessions and Expansions315
Realized and expected excess returns offer contrasted dynamics inside each phase of the316
business cycle.317
4.1. Realized Equity Returns318
Table 2 reports averages across recessions and expansions, as well as summary statistics319
on each investment that starts in the n-th three-month period after the NBER trough (peak)320
and ends one year later.321
The right-hand side of Table 2 presents data on expansions. In the 1945.1 – 2009.12322
(1925.12 – 2009.12) sample, the average returns, conditional on being in an expansion, decline323
from 7.5% (9.3%) in the first quarter after the trough to 1.9% (5.0%) in the third quarter324
after the trough. Standard errors on average excess returns are large (around 5%), and such325
changes are almost statistically significant. After three quarters, average returns tend to326
increase again.327
The volatility of stock returns tends to decline slightly during expansions, from 4.2%328
(4.9%) in the first quarter to 3.7% in the last quarter (4.8%). Volatility is measured as the329
standard deviation of the monthly returns over the investment period and is not annualized.330
It is admittedly a crude measure of stock return volatility, but higher frequency data deliver331
similar results.5332
After three quarters, it seems fair to assume that investors know that the economy is in333
an expansion. The average return of 4.0% (5.0%) in the third quarter after a trough can334
thus be interpreted as a measure of the conditional expected excess return on U.S. equities335
in expansions.336
The left-hand side of Table 2 reports data on recessions. In the 1945.1 – 2009.12 (1925.12337
5Daily returns are available from CRSP starting in 1925. Equity volatility can thus be obtained as
the standard deviation of daily equity returns over each calendar month. Table ?? in the Appendix reports
moments of this equity volatility measure across business cycles, along with moments of equity excess returns
and Sharpe ratios over two samples: 1925.12 – 2009.12 and 1945.1 – 2009.12. In both samples, the same
pattern as in Table 2 emerges.
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– 2009.12) sample, average realized returns conditional on being in a recession increase from338
7.5% (4.5% in the whole sample) in the first quarter after a peak to 13.0% (10.7%) in the339
fourth quarter after a peak. The variation in the second moment of returns is much smaller.6340
After four quarters, again, it seems fair to conclude that investors know that the economy is341
in a recession. The average return of 13.0% (10.7%) in the fourth quarter after a peak can342
thus be interpreted as a measure of the conditional expected excess return on U.S. equities343
in recessions.344
Because of the dynamics of excess return during each phase of the business cycle, a large345
difference in the aggregate compensation per unit of risk appears: the Sharpe ratio is 0.14346
(0.32 in the whole sample) in the midpoint of the expansions examined, compared to 0.82347
(0.57) in the midpoint of a recession. Figure 2 illustrates the substantial variation in realized348
Sharpe ratios in the post-WWII sample. The realized Sharpe ratio increases monotonically349
from one quarter into a recession to reach a maximum of 0.82 four quarters into a recession,350
and it declines during expansions from 0.51 in the first quarter into an expansion to reach a351
minimum of 0.14 three quarters into an expansion.352
[Figure 2 about here.]353
4.2. Robustness Checks354
The sample in the first two panels of Table 2 contains only 16 business cycles and thus355
offers a limited number of observations. Looking back to the nineteenth century or studying356
foreign countries extends the sample: those two robustness checks lead to consistent results.357
There are 32 business cycles in the NBER data, which starts in 1854. Sixteen of these358
cycles took place before 1919. By including this earlier period, the number of observations359
double. However, using a longer period also adds structural breaks: since 1915, the nature360
of NBER business cycles has changed. The length of recessions has shortened dramatically.361
6The volatility of stock returns tends to increase initially during recessions, but then it declines slightly.
Higher frequencies deliver a similar pattern, but this variation in volatility does not appear significant.
However, there is a clear difference in volatilities between the mid-point of a recession and the mid-point of
an expansion: 4.5% (5.4%) in a recession and 4.0% (4.6%) in an expansion.
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The average number of months from peak to trough decreased from 22 between 1854 and362
1915, to 18 between 1919 and 1945, and to 10 months between 1945 and 2009. The average363
length of expansions has increased from 27 months in the first part of the sample, to 35364
months in the interwar, and to 57 months in the post-war sample.365
The 1854-1944 period delivers similar dynamics as in the previous, more recent samples.366
In the pre-WWII sample (not reported), the conditional Sharpe ratio decreases from 0.88 in367
the first quarter after the trough to 0.26 five quarters later. It increases from -0.29 in the first368
quarter after the peak to 0.44 five quarters later. In the whole sample (1854.1 – 2009.12),369
the same patterns emerge. Realized Sharpe ratios vary dramatically over the business cycle:370
one quarter after the turning points, Sharpe ratios are up to 0.75 during expansions and371
down to -0.11 during recessions. These differences are clearly significant as standard errors372
hover around 0.2. Sharpe ratios become close only four quarters after the turning points. It373
takes longer for Sharpe ratios to increase after peaks and to decrease after troughs in the374
pre-WWII than in the post-WWII sample. It would not be unreasonable to assume that it375
took longer for agents to learn about the state of the economy pre- than post-WWII.376
Equity returns in G7 countries and OECD business cycle dates offer a second robustness377
check. The time-period (1955.1–2010.8) is defined by the availability of the OECD turning378
points. To save space, detailed results are reported in the Appendix. In all the G7 countries,379
the Sharpe ratios tend to increase during recessions and decrease during expansions. In all380
G7 countries except Germany, the Sharpe ratios in the middle of recessions (e.g., 12 months381
after peaks) are higher than in the middle of expansions. This is also true on average across382
all G7 countries.383
4.3. Expected Equity Excess Returns384
Similar findings also emerge with real-time recession dates. As in the previous section,385
recessions are defined using monthly probabilities and the Chicago Fed index. Again, Tables386
3 and 4 report averages across recessions and expansions along with the whole dynamics of387
returns and Sharpe ratios inside each phase of the business cycle.388
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As a comparison point, realized equity excess returns increase sharply during NBER389
recessions, from -5.4% at a peak to 13.3% five quarters later (see Panel I of Table 3). The390
standard errors obtained by bootstrapping are large because of the sample size. Yet, with391
an average around 8%, these standard errors still imply significant variation in equity excess392
returns along the business cycle. Realized equity excess returns increase slightly from 0.4%393
at a trough to 1.1% three quarters later, although this variation is not significant. Average394
returns increase again four and five quarters after the trough to reach 8.6%. This is similar395
to the findings in other samples. Four quarters into a recession, excess returns are on average396
equal to 10.1%, while they are equal to 1.1% three quarters into an expansion.397
Panels II and III of Table 3 report results obtained with Chauvet and Piger (2008)398
probability-implied dates (using one and two cutoffs). As noted before, recession probabil-399
ities imply a clearly higher average excess returns in recessions than in expansions. Inside400
each phase of the business cycle, the dynamics, however, are less clear than in the longer401
sample. The one-cutoff rule delivers decreasing Sharpe ratios during expansions, but the402
two-cutoff rule does not. Inversely, the two-cutoff rule leads to increasing Sharpe ratios dur-403
ing recessions, but the one-cutoff rule does not, simply delivering very large Sharpe ratios in404
the first four quarters of recessions. These results are not surprising: the one-cutoff rule calls405
a recession after three consecutive months of high recession probabilities (above 0.8), while406
the one-cutoff rule signals it as soon as the probability increases above 0.6. As a result, the407
two-cutoff recession dates occur after their one-cutoff counterparts: later into a recession,408
risk premia are higher. But comparing again the midst of a recession to the midst of an409
expansion delivers clear results: excess returns are on average equal to 7.1% (7.8% with two410
cutoffs) four quarters into a recession, while they are equal to 2.4% (4.2%) three quarters411
into an expansion.412
Panels I and II of Table 4 reports results obtained with the Chicago Fed-implied dates.413
Realized excess returns increase from -5.9% to 6.2% from the peak to five quarters later.414
They decrease from 3.0% at the trough to -0.8% three quarters later, and then increase415
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back to 6.2% five quarters after the peak. For the same reason as above, the one-cutoff416
dates deliver large excess returns in the first quarters of recessions. And again, the midst417
of a recession leads to much higher excess returns than the midst of an expansion. Similar418
results appear when combining recession probabilities and the Chicago Fed index.419
Overall, the patterns obtained with alternative real-time recession rules are quite similar420
to those obtained with benchmark NBER dates. As in longer samples, equity excess returns421
are clearly higher in the midst of recessions than in the midst of expansions. They tend to422
increase during recessions and decrease during expansions, although these higher frequency423
dynamics appear less clearly on a shorter sample.424
5. Cash Flows or Discount Rates?425
s426
The large difference between expected excess returns and Sharpe ratios in expansions vs.427
recessions points to time-varying risk premia as an important driver of equity prices. Yet, a428
second mechanism also drives changes in equity prices: revisions in expected future dividend429
growth rates.430
5.1. Cash Flow Evidence431
Expected future dividend growth rates also depend on the state of the business cycle.432
Table 5 reports the conditional moments of those future real dividends, using the same433
methodology as for excess returns in the previous sections. The dividend growth rate dated434
t corresponds to the percentage increase in aggregate dividends between t and t+12. Averages435
are obtained on three samples (1925.12 – 2009.12 in Panel I, 1945.1 – 2009.12 in Panel II,436
and 1967.1 – 2009.12 in Panel III). Two findings emerge: average 12-month dividend growth437
rates are lower during recessions than expansions, and they tend to increase from the start438
to the end of recessions.439
[Table 5 about here.]440
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In the longer sample, the average 12-month real dividend growth rate is 2% during441
recessions vs. 6.8% during expansions. The same results appear in the shorter samples:442
2.6% vs. 5.3% for the post-WWII sample and -1% vs. 4.5% for the post-1967 sample.443
During recessions, growth rates increase from -2.7% (not reported) to 4.3% from the peak444
to five quarters later. Similar patterns appear on the shorter samples, with increases from445
-1.3% to 4.7% and from -5.9% to 2.7%. If investors revise their expectations according to446
the same schedule, stock prices should increase during recessions, delivering positive returns.447
Lower than expected cash flows at the start of recessions could explain the low excess returns448
measured in the previous section. Likewise, higher than expected future cash flows could449
deliver higher returns further away from the peak of the business cycle. Part of the variation450
on realized excess returns could thus correspond to cash flow effects, not risk premia.451
During expansions, the patterns are less clear. Dividend growth rates are essentially flat452
in our entire sample, but increase in our post-WWII samples. They vary from 6.9% (at the453
peak, not reported) to 6.8% in the whole sample; increasing from 3.9% to 5.9% post-war,454
and from 0.6% to 6.4% post 1967. The increase is only significant in the shortest sample.455
Such increases should also lead to higher returns. Here, those cash flow effects reinforce456
the previous results (i.e. the decreases in realized equity excess returns during expansions).457
Such decreases are all the more surprising since they occur during periods when cash flow458
growth rates are revised upwards. As a result, these decreasing equity excess returns are459
accompanied by large decreases in equity risk premia during expansions.460
5.2. Variance Decomposition in Recessions461
The case of recessions deserves further scrutiny. Although expected returns increase462
during recessions, expected dividend growth rates also increase during recessions. As a463
result, these dynamics do not clearly indicate whether equity prices are driven mostly by464
cash flow or discount rate news during recessions. There might be reasons to believe that465
cash flow news account for most of the variation in prices during recessions, while discount466
rates account for most of the variation in normal times. To the contrary, a classic variance467
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decomposition of dividend yields shows that stock return predictability actually increases in468
recessions, while cash flow predictability does not.469
This conclusion emerges from standard regressions of log real returns and log dividend
growth on the log of the dividend yield, in which the slope coefficients depend on the state of
the economy. The annual dividend yield (Dt/Pt) is obtained by dividing the cum dividend
return by the ex dividend return. Lower cases denote logs.7 The recession dummy, denoted
rec, is 1 if the U.S. economy is in an NBER recession in December of that same year. Table
6 reports regression results of returns or dividend growth in the following year (from January
to December) on the dividend yield in December and the dividend yield interacted with the
recession dummy in December. The results thus correspond to the following regressions:
rt+1 = a+ (br + b
rec
r × rect) d˜pt + εt+1, (1)
∆dt+1 = a+ (bd + b
rec
d × rect) d˜pt + t+1. (2)
The first panel of Table 6 pertains to the full sample (i.e. 1927–2009). The first two columns
report results obtained when excluding the recession dummies. An increase in the dividend
yield of 10% increases the expected return by 2.67 percentage points (pps) per annum (col-
umn 1). A one-standard deviation change in the log dividend yield increase is 27%. Put
differently, an increase of 100 bps in the dividend yield increases the expected return by
more than 700 bps, given that the mean log dividend yield is 3.75%. The adjusted dividend
yield explains 10% of the variation in subsequent annual returns in the stock market. On
the other hand, the dividend growth regression in column (2) shows very little cash flow
predictability. An increase in the dividend yield of 10% increases expected dividend growth
by 0.39 bps per annum. Hence, the slope coefficient does not have the expected sign. This
is a classic result, derived from the log-linearization of the return equation around the mean
7See the Online Appendix for historical times series of the dividend yield. The dividend yield drifts
downward after 1990. Following Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008), the estimation thus allows for a
break in the dividend yield in December of 1991.
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log price/dividend ratio:
rt+1 = ∆dt+1 + ρpdt+1 + k − pdt, (3)
where ρ is a linearization coefficient that depends on the mean of the log price/dividend
ratio pd: ρ = e
pd
epd+1
< 1. By iterating forward on the log-linearized expression for returns,
















Assuming, as in Cochrane (2008), that the dividend yield follows an AR(1), the equation470
above implies a cross-equation restriction in the estimated slope coefficients: br
1−ρφ− bd1−ρφ = 1.471
This cross-equation restriction is not imposed in the estimation of the return and dividend472
growth regressions, but its first component is 103%, implying that all of the variation in the473
dividend yield is accounted for by discount rates.474
[Table 6 about here.]475
Regression results in column (3) of Table 6 allow the slope to shift with the state of the476
U.S. economy. The slope increases by 0.411 in recessions. Hence, a 10% increase in the477
dividend yield increases expected returns by 5.60 pps in a recession, compared to only 1.75478
pps in an expansion. The slope coefficient triples in recessions. These estimates imply an479
expected return of 19.3% in December of 2008, almost two standard deviations above the480
sample mean of 8%.481








increases during recessions to 220% of its value for the entire sample if one assumes that the482
same AR (1) parameter ρ applies. However, it seems reasonable that the persistence of the483
dividend yield is actually smaller when it comes to these cyclical variations in risk premia. If484
the persistence of the dividend yield φ drops from 0.77 to 0.46, then the ratio is still 100%.485
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There is no evidence that cash flows become more important in recessions.486
Panel II of Table 6 reports results for the 1945–2009 period. These results are stronger.487
The total effect on expected returns of a 10% increase in the dividend yield in recessions is488
6.70 pps. The slope coefficient in the dividend growth predictability regression still has the489
wrong coefficient, and it increases in recessions. These post-war estimates imply an expected490
return of 23.1% in December of 2008, more than 2 standard deviations above the post-war491
sample mean of 6.44%.492
Predictability regressions thus reinforce the prominent role of business cycle variation493
in risk premia reported in the paper. Cash flow news do not seem to be able to explain494
the whole variation in the risk-return tradeoff along the business cycle. Simulations from a495
simple toy model reinforces this point.496
5.3. Simulations497
Imagine the following mechanical link: assume (i) that excess returns and business cycles498
are correlated and (ii) that the NBER defines a peak as a period followed by low growth.499
Then, peaks would correspond to low excess returns and would be followed by higher excess500
returns. But this finding — driven by a look-ahead bias in the definition of peaks and troughs501
— would purely reflect changes in future cash flows, not risk premia. Simulations, however,502
show that the look-ahead bias is very limited if one takes into account the empirically low503
correlation between realized equity returns and consumption growth. In the interest of space,504
the simulations are described in the Online Appendix.505
What is the bottom line? Assume that the Bry-Boschan algorithm (used to determine506
peaks and troughs) implies a two-quarter look ahead bias, then it would take a very large507
sample to convincingly show that the investment strategy implies two negative (positive)508
returns after peaks (troughs). Moreover, the look-ahead bias would not affect strategies that509
start more than two periods after the turning points. Yet, the empirical findings reported510
in this paper do not disappear after two periods and pertain to small samples. The largest511
difference between excess returns in recessions and expansions actually appears four quarters512
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after the peaks and troughs.513
The evidence reported here thus suggests a large role to time-varying risk premia in514
determining business cycle variation in equity prices. This finding relates to a large literature515
in macro-finance.516
6. Literature Review517
A large literature explores the predictability of equity excess returns (see Lettau and518
Ludvigson (2009) for a survey and recent evidence). The consensus is that excess returns519
appear somewhat predictable, especially at horizons equal to or above one year. Predictabil-520
ity results, however, depend on samples and predictors and they often rely on sophisticated521
econometric techniques. This paper takes a different, more simple approach. We study re-522
alized excess returns and show that they are on average a good measure of expected excess523
returns. The exercise is worth entertaining because of its focus on excess returns at precise524
points in business cycles: the quarters that follow the peak of a cycle and thus signal the525
start of a recession and the quarters that follow the trough of a cycle and thus signal the526
start of an expansion. As a result, the paper focuses on excess returns conditional on the527
state of the economy. These turning points are informative about marginal utility growth.528
Cochrane (2007) summarizes it very clearly, “The challenge is to find the right measure of529
“bad times,” rises in the marginal value of wealth, so that we can understand high average530
returns or low prices as compensation for assets tendency to pay off poorly in bad times.”531
Our paper seeks to address this key challenge.532
Building on the predictability literature, a few papers investigate the cyclicality of excess533
returns and the dynamics of the Sharpe ratio. Fama and French (1989) find that default534
spreads, a business conditions variable, predict equity and bond returns, as does the dividend535
yield, which they interpret as a proxy for long-term business conditions. They conclude that536
the implied variation in expected excess returns is largely common across securities and is537
negatively related to long- and short-term business conditions. Ferson and Harvey (1991)538
plot expected equity excess returns along with NBER recession dates and note that risk539
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premia increase during recessions and peak near business cycle troughs. Harrison and Zhang540
(1999) report that nonparametric estimates of conditional mean excess returns are negatively541
correlated with proxies for the business cycle. Campbell and Diebold (2009) reach a similar542
conclusion using the Livingston business conditions survey data. Backus et al. (2010) report543
the correlation at different leads and lags between monthly equity returns and industrial544
production growth over the period from 1960 to 2008. They find that high excess returns are545
associated with high future growth. Lettau and Ludvigson (2009) measure the conditional546
Sharpe ratio on U.S. equities by forecasting stock market returns and realized volatility using547
different predictors. They obtain highly countercyclical and volatile Sharpe ratios and show548
that neither the external habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) nor the long run549
risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) deliver volatile enough Sharpe ratios to match the550
data. Using a latent VAR process, Brandt and Kang (2004) also find a highly countercyclical551
Sharpe ratio. Ludvigson and Ng (2007) reach the same conclusion using a large number of552
predictors in a dynamic factor analysis. However, Goyal and Welch (2008) stress the poor553
out-of-sample performance of many of these predictors. They conclude that these predictors554
would have been of little help to actual investors using real-time data.555
We do not use any predictors or high-powered econometrics but take a broad and long-556
term perspective, going back to the nineteenth century in the U.S. and studying several557
developed economies. By focusing on the turning points of each cycle, we recognize the558
limited number of recessions in any sample and favor a simple procedure that can be easily559
replicated. The results highlight strong links between business cycles characterized by real560
macro-economic variables and equity returns and thus depart from sentiment-based expla-561
nations of asset markets (see notably Long et al. (1990) and Baker and Wurgler (2006)).562
7. Conclusion563
To study the cyclicality of expected returns without committing to one dynamic asset564
pricing model, we focus on realized excess returns conditional on NBER business cycle dates.565
Realized excess returns proxy well for their expected counterparts, since mechanical, real-566
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time recession dates deliver similar results. Empirically, average equity excess returns are567
higher during recessions than during expansions, and averages hide much larger variation568
during each phase of the business cycle, implying large changes in Sharpe ratios. The findings569
imply that value-maximizing managers face much higher risk-adjusted cost of capital in their570
investment decisions during recessions than expansions.571
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Table 1: One-Quarter Realized Equity Excess Returns Across Business Cycles: Monthly Data
The table report moments of excess returns across business cycles: it presents the average stock market excess returns in each
three-month period following the NBER peaks (left panel) and troughs (right panel). Total return indices are compiled by
CRSP. Risk-free rates correspond to returns on Treasury bill indices from Global Financial Data. Data are monthly. The
samples are 1925.12 – 2009.12, 1945.1 – 2009.12, and 1854.1 – 2009.12. The table reports average excess returns (annualized,
i.e., multiplied by 12), standard deviations (not annualized), and Sharpe ratios (annualized, i.e., multiplied by
√
12). Standard
errors are obtained by bootstrapping.
Recessions Expansions
Buy in n− th 3-month period after peak Buy in n− th 3-month period after trough
and sell one quarter later and sell one quarter later
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average
Panel I: 1925.12 – 2009.12
Mean −10.63 11.56 2.19 15.58 18.97 7.53 18.35 3.09 9.84 8.56 3.49 8.78
s.e [7.70] [7.20] [10.50] [8.96] [7.59] [3.88] [7.70] [7.42] [11.48] [9.29] [7.20] [3.41]
Std. Dev. 5.03 4.79 6.93 5.99 4.93 5.63 4.92 4.87 4.97 4.86 4.57 4.83
s.e [0.41] [0.37] [0.89] [0.78] [0.42] [0.32] [0.42] [0.39] [0.91] [0.81] [0.41] [0.22]
Sharpe Ratio −0.61 0.70 0.09 0.75 1.11 0.39 1.08 0.18 0.57 0.51 0.22 0.52
s.e [0.43] [0.48] [0.45] [0.43] [0.47] [0.21] [0.43] [0.50] [0.50] [0.44] [0.45] [0.21]
Panel II: 1945.1 – 2009.12
Mean −4.64 11.79 5.40 18.46 18.36 9.87 15.72 7.49 5.72 4.16 2.83 7.34
s.e [7.87] [8.36] [10.25] [8.68] [7.82] [3.75] [7.47] [8.03] [9.78] [8.57] [8.53] [3.05]
Std. Dev. 4.51 4.81 5.89 4.95 4.78 5.02 4.09 4.13 4.30 3.94 3.95 4.06
s.e [0.35] [0.43] [0.81] [0.52] [0.48] [0.27] [0.37] [0.46] [0.77] [0.55] [0.49] [0.19]
Sharpe Ratio −0.30 0.71 0.26 1.08 1.11 0.57 1.11 0.52 0.38 0.30 0.21 0.52
s.e [0.52] [0.57] [0.54] [0.55] [0.51] [0.22] [0.49] [0.55] [0.52] [0.53] [0.56] [0.22]
Panel III: 1854.1 – 2009.12
Mean −14.40 −2.21 1.30 10.56 11.76 1.40 19.10 7.27 9.75 11.64 10.61 11.71
s.e [5.79] [10.79] [5.69] [4.89] [4.44] [2.99] [5.86] [10.17] [5.94] [4.85] [4.15] [2.04]
Std. Dev. 5.35 10.09 5.56 4.80 4.06 6.37 4.32 4.06 4.23 3.98 3.94 4.11
s.e [0.58] [3.83] [0.56] [0.51] [0.27] [1.13] [0.56] [3.71] [0.58] [0.53] [0.28] [0.15]
Sharpe Ratio −0.78 −0.06 0.07 0.64 0.84 0.06 1.28 0.52 0.66 0.84 0.78 0.82
s.e [0.29] [0.39] [0.30] [0.28] [0.32] [0.15] [0.30] [0.36] [0.31] [0.28] [0.30] [0.15]
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Table 2: One-Year Realized Equity Excess Returns Across Business Cycles: Monthly Data
The table reports moments of excess returns obtained by the following investment strategy: in expansions (recessions), the
investor buys the stock market index in the n-th three-month period (n = 1, 2, ..., 5) after the NBER trough (peak) and sells
one year later. Total return indices are compiled by CRSP. Risk-free rates correspond to returns on Treasury bill indices from
Global Financial Data. Data are monthly. The samples are 1925.12 – 2009.12, 1945.1 – 2009.12, and 1854.1 – 2009.12. The
table reports average excess returns (annualized, i.e., multiplied by 12), standard deviations (not annualized), and Sharpe ratios
(annualized, i.e., multiplied by
√
12). Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping.
Recessions Expansions
Buy in n− th 3-month period after peak Buy in n− th 3-month period after trough
and sell one year later and sell one year later
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average
Panel I: 1925.12 – 2009.12
Mean 4.52 12.29 9.64 10.69 8.32 9.09 9.26 3.89 5.03 3.66 6.72 5.73
s.e [5.19] [5.54] [5.01] [4.85] [4.99] [2.20] [5.10] [5.53] [5.46] [4.73] [5.01] [1.99]
Std. Dev. 6.05 6.03 6.13 5.37 5.51 5.82 4.91 4.80 4.59 4.87 4.80 4.79
s.e [0.51] [0.44] [0.46] [0.38] [0.48] [0.19] [0.47] [0.45] [0.45] [0.38] [0.49] [0.16]
Sharpe Ratio 0.22 0.59 0.45 0.57 0.44 0.45 0.54 0.23 0.32 0.22 0.40 0.35
s.e [0.26] [0.28] [0.25] [0.26] [0.28] [0.11] [0.25] [0.27] [0.27] [0.26] [0.28] [0.12]
Panel II: 1945.1 – 2009.12
Mean 7.53 14.13 11.45 12.96 10.49 11.31 7.45 2.77 1.89 5.59 8.67 5.28
s.e [5.27] [5.20] [5.38] [4.66] [4.70] [2.20] [5.05] [5.30] [4.92] [4.36] [4.59] [1.87]
Std. Dev. 5.11 5.26 5.29 4.55 4.52 4.95 4.22 4.15 3.95 3.80 3.73 3.97
s.e [0.38] [0.36] [0.37] [0.28] [0.26] [0.15] [0.37] [0.38] [0.38] [0.27] [0.26] [0.11]
Sharpe Ratio 0.43 0.78 0.62 0.82 0.67 0.66 0.51 0.19 0.14 0.42 0.67 0.38
s.e [0.31] [0.31] [0.31] [0.31] [0.31] [0.14] [0.30] [0.32] [0.29] [0.29] [0.30] [0.14]
Panel III: 1854.1 – 2009.12
Mean −2.86 4.31 7.27 8.35 8.24 5.06 10.96 8.46 8.39 6.45 5.72 8.00
s.e [4.51] [4.13] [3.00] [2.90] [2.67] [1.54] [4.46] [4.31] [2.96] [2.55] [2.68] [1.11]
Std. Dev. 7.39 7.16 4.95 4.46 4.53 5.85 4.22 4.13 4.06 4.23 4.34 4.19
s.e [1.70] [1.69] [0.29] [0.24] [0.30] [0.60] [1.72] [1.84] [0.28] [0.24] [0.31] [0.10]
Sharpe Ratio −0.11 0.17 0.42 0.54 0.53 0.25 0.75 0.59 0.60 0.44 0.38 0.55
s.e [0.17] [0.21] [0.17] [0.19] [0.18] [0.09] [0.17] [0.21] [0.18] [0.17] [0.18] [0.08]
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Table 3: One-Year Realized Equity Excess Returns Across Business Cycles: Mechanical Business Cycle
Dates
The table reports moments of excess returns obtained by the following investment strategy: in expansions (recessions), the
investor buys the stock market index in the n-th three-month period (n = 1, 2, ..., 5) after the trough (peak) and sells one year
later. Six different sets of recession dates are used: the NBER dates, the Chauvet and Piger’s (2008) probability-implied dates
(using either one or two cutoff values to define recessions), the Chicago Fed index-implied dates (again using either one or two
cutoff values to define recessions), and a combination of probability- and index-implied dates. Recessions are defined according to
the following rules: (1) A recession starts when the recession probability stays above 80% for at least three consecutive months
and ends when the recession probability falls below 80% (one cutoff); (2) a recession occurs when the recession probability
increases above 60% and lasts until the probability decreases below 30% (two cutoffs); (3) a recession occurs when the Chicago
Fed index falls below -0.7 for at least three consecutive months and ends when it climbs above -0.7 (one cutoff); (4) a recession
starts when the Chicago Fed index falls below -0.7 and ends when it increases above 0.2 (two cutoffs); and (5) a recession starts
and ends when both probability- and index-based criteria are satisfied (two cutoffs each). The data frequency is monthly. The
sample runs from 1967.1 to 2009.12. The table reports the average excess return on this investment strategy (annualized, i.e.,
multiplied by 12), the standard deviation (not annualized), and the Sharpe ratio (annualized, i.e., multiplied by
√
12). Standard
errors are obtained by bootstrapping.
Recessions Expansions
Buy in n− th 3-month period after peak Buy in n− th 3-month period after trough
and sell one year later and sell one year later
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average
Panel I: NBER Dates, 1967.1 2009.12
Mean −5.41 2.36 4.16 10.15 13.32 4.87 0.39 −1.96 1.14 2.30 8.63 2.07
s.e [7.57] [8.37] [8.49] [6.67] [6.14] [3.40] [7.38] [8.17] [8.40] [6.72] [6.40] [2.47]
Std. Dev. 5.94 6.25 6.19 5.14 4.88 5.71 4.48 4.20 4.02 3.62 3.54 3.98
s.e [0.49] [0.49] [0.50] [0.34] [0.35] [0.23] [0.51] [0.49] [0.50] [0.37] [0.33] [0.17]
Sharpe Ratio −0.26 0.11 0.19 0.57 0.79 0.25 0.03 −0.13 0.08 0.18 0.70 0.15
s.e [0.38] [0.39] [0.41] [0.38] [0.37] [0.17] [0.36] [0.38] [0.40] [0.38] [0.39] [0.18]
Panel II: Chauvet and Piger’s (2008) Probability-implied Dates (One Cutoff)
Mean 14.57 16.14 16.97 7.16 0.74 11.38 13.01 10.96 2.38 −1.90 −1.32 4.80
s.e [7.98] [7.25] [6.51] [5.35] [5.69] [2.95] [8.49] [6.49] [6.64] [5.22] [5.28] [2.67]
Std. Dev. 5.81 4.93 4.45 3.71 3.59 4.61 4.27 4.24 3.96 3.66 3.65 3.98
s.e [0.56] [0.39] [0.36] [0.36] [0.36] [0.21] [0.56] [0.38] [0.37] [0.35] [0.37] [0.19]
Sharpe Ratio 0.72 0.95 1.10 0.56 0.06 0.71 0.88 0.75 0.17 −0.15 −0.10 0.35
s.e [0.42] [0.44] [0.42] [0.41] [0.47] [0.19] [0.46] [0.39] [0.42] [0.41] [0.43] [0.19]
Panel III: Chauvet and Piger’s (2008) Probability-implied Dates (Two Cutoffs)
Mean 3.72 5.23 10.64 7.81 5.29 6.55 −0.82 −2.01 4.17 1.04 9.69 2.37
s.e [7.94] [7.79] [6.76] [6.60] [5.81] [3.03] [8.28] [7.55] [6.77] [6.51] [5.57] [2.69]
Std. Dev. 6.22 5.78 5.13 4.89 4.25 5.29 4.49 4.23 4.25 3.61 3.49 4.03
s.e [0.48] [0.46] [0.38] [0.36] [0.36] [0.20] [0.50] [0.45] [0.36] [0.36] [0.34] [0.17]
Sharpe Ratio 0.17 0.26 0.60 0.46 0.36 0.36 −0.05 −0.14 0.28 0.08 0.80 0.17
s.e [0.37] [0.40] [0.39] [0.40] [0.40] [0.17] [0.39] [0.39] [0.40] [0.39] [0.39] [0.19]
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Table 4: One-Year Realized Equity Excess Returns Across Business Cycles: Mechanical Business Cycle
Dates, Continued
The table reports moments of excess returns obtained by the following investment strategy: in expansions (recessions), the
investor buys the stock market index in the n-th three-month period (n = 1, 2, ..., 5) after the trough (peak) and sells one year
later. Six different sets of recession dates are used: the NBER dates, the Chauvet and Piger’s (2008) probability-implied dates
(using either one or two cutoff values to define recessions), the Chicago Fed index-implied dates (again using either one or two
cutoff values to define recessions), and a combination of probability- and index-implied dates. Recessions are defined according to
the following rules: (1) A recession starts when the recession probability stays above 80% for at least three consecutive months
and ends when the recession probability falls below 80% (one cutoff); (2) a recession occurs when the recession probability
increases above 60% and lasts until the probability decreases below 30% (two cutoffs); (3) a recession occurs when the Chicago
Fed index falls below -0.7 for at least three consecutive months and ends when it climbs above -0.7 (one cutoff); (4) a recession
starts when the Chicago Fed index falls below -0.7 and ends when it increases above 0.2 (two cutoffs); and (5) a recession starts
and ends when both probability- and index-based criteria are satisfied (two cutoffs each). The data frequency is monthly. The
sample runs from 1967:1 to 2009:12. The table reports the average excess return on this investment strategy (annualized, i.e.,
multiplied by 12), the standard deviation (not annualized), and the Sharpe ratio (annualized, i.e., multiplied by
√
12). Standard
errors are obtained by bootstrapping.
Recessions Expansions
Buy in n− th 3-month period after peak Buy in n− th 3-month period after trough
and sell one year later and sell one year later
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average
Panel I: Chicago Fed National Activity Index-implied Dates (One Cutoff)
Mean 8.62 5.80 10.93 7.60 1.66 6.98 3.40 1.54 4.04 3.98 9.45 4.48
s.e [6.52] [6.53] [5.80] [5.42] [4.91] [2.52] [6.68] [6.50] [5.86] [5.18] [4.73] [2.32]
Std. Dev. 5.36 5.42 4.74 4.30 3.80 4.76 4.34 4.07 3.70 3.56 3.62 3.86
s.e [0.42] [0.44] [0.33] [0.32] [0.29] [0.18] [0.47] [0.43] [0.35] [0.34] [0.29] [0.14]
Sharpe Ratio 0.46 0.31 0.67 0.51 0.13 0.42 0.23 0.11 0.32 0.32 0.75 0.33
s.e [0.36] [0.36] [0.35] [0.37] [0.38] [0.16] [0.38] [0.36] [0.36] [0.35] [0.36] [0.17]
Panel II: Chicago Fed National Activity Index-implied Dates (Two Cutoffs)
Mean −5.92 3.55 8.41 10.42 6.16 4.49 3.00 1.75 0.83 4.80 6.24 3.33
s.e [8.15] [8.14] [7.09] [6.99] [5.98] [3.37] [8.39] [8.21] [6.71] [7.17] [5.85] [2.26]
Std. Dev. 6.38 6.18 5.35 5.10 4.49 5.55 3.64 3.40 3.40 3.54 3.59 3.50
s.e [0.49] [0.51] [0.35] [0.37] [0.30] [0.20] [0.50] [0.49] [0.35] [0.33] [0.32] [0.15]
Sharpe Ratio −0.27 0.17 0.45 0.59 0.40 0.23 0.24 0.15 0.07 0.39 0.50 0.27
s.e [0.37] [0.38] [0.39] [0.41] [0.39] [0.18] [0.39] [0.39] [0.37] [0.42] [0.38] [0.18]
Panel III: Probability- and Index-implied Dates
Mean 9.03 7.53 9.99 3.07 2.05 6.43 −0.82 −2.01 4.17 1.04 9.69 2.37
s.e [7.40] [6.67] [6.33] [5.63] [5.69] [3.01] [7.19] [6.36] [6.61] [5.60] [5.72] [2.50]
Std. Dev. 5.54 5.05 4.79 4.31 4.13 4.79 4.49 4.23 4.25 3.61 3.49 4.03
s.e [0.48] [0.35] [0.36] [0.32] [0.34] [0.18] [0.50] [0.36] [0.37] [0.36] [0.34] [0.16]
Sharpe Ratio 0.47 0.43 0.60 0.21 0.14 0.39 −0.05 −0.14 0.28 0.08 0.80 0.17
s.e [0.41] [0.39] [0.39] [0.38] [0.41] [0.18] [0.40] [0.37] [0.41] [0.38] [0.41] [0.18]
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Table 5: One-Year Realized Dividend Growth Across Business Cycles
This table reports the average annual dividend growth rates across different periods that start in the n− th three months after
NBER troughs (peaks) and end one year later. Annual nominal dividend growth rates are obtained from monthly CRSP equity
return series including and excluding dividends. Consumer Price Index series from CRSP are used to obtain real dividend
growth rates. Data are monthly and the three samples are 1925.12 – 2009.12 in Panel I, 1945.1 – 2009.12 in Panel II, and 1967.1
– 2009.12 in Panel III. Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping.
Recessions Expansions
Start in n− th 3-month period after peak Start in n− th 3-month period after trough
and ends one year later and ends one year later
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Average
Panel I: 1925.12 – 2009.12
Mean −1.03 0.60 3.22 3.25 4.27 2.02 7.43 7.41 6.97 5.99 6.31 6.82
s.e [1.23] [1.21] [1.40] [1.27] [1.61] [0.62] [1.31] [1.38] [1.39] [1.38] [1.56] [0.65]
Std. Dev. 17.14 17.27 18.65 18.26 20.36 18.42 19.70 19.26 17.78 16.65 20.20 18.73
s.e [1.08] [1.11] [1.73] [1.76] [1.81] [0.70] [1.06] [1.04] [1.87] [1.86] [1.79] [1.11]
Panel II: 1945.1 – 2009.12
Mean 0.45 1.14 3.31 3.55 4.68 2.59 4.65 5.13 5.86 4.96 5.88 5.30
s.e [1.36] [1.34] [1.44] [1.33] [1.53] [0.63] [1.36] [1.52] [1.55] [1.45] [1.56] [0.69]
Std. Dev. 16.50 16.99 17.75 16.11 17.45 16.99 16.62 16.89 17.79 15.97 20.94 17.68
s.e [1.15] [1.18] [2.09] [2.28] [1.95] [0.84] [1.17] [1.20] [2.14] [2.25] [2.20] [1.40]
Panel II: 1967.1 – 2009.12
Mean −3.62 −3.48 −1.04 1.05 2.73 −0.99 2.61 3.75 5.10 4.77 6.37 4.52
s.e [1.51] [1.56] [1.56] [1.57] [1.75] [0.71] [1.51] [1.51] [1.52] [1.62] [1.75] [0.84]
Std. Dev. 13.87 13.71 13.61 13.86 15.15 14.18 14.72 14.63 14.92 14.26 23.21 16.66
s.e [1.37] [1.27] [1.31] [1.27] [1.32] [0.56] [1.29] [1.29] [1.29] [1.15] [1.30] [2.35]
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Table 6: Return Predictability in NBER Recessions
This table reports estimation results for the following pair of regressions:
rt+1 = a+ (br + b
rec
r × rec) d˜pt + εt+1,
∆dt+1 = a+ (bd + b
rec
d × rec) d˜pt + t+1,
where rec denotes NBER recession dummies, rt+1 denotes logs of the real return on the CRSP value-weighted index, ∆dt+1
denotes real dividend growth, and d˜pt denotes the break-adjusted dividend yield. Columns (1) and (2) exclude the NBER
recession dummies in the regression. Column (3) and (4) include the NBER recession dummies in the regression. Data are
annual and the sample is 1927–2009. OLS t-stats are reported in brackets; White t-stats are reported in parenthesis. The last
two rows of each panel report the R2s of these regressions and the infinite-horizon regression coefficient (b/(1 − ρφ)) defined
by Cochrane (2008), assuming that the dividend yield follows an AR(1). The mean ρ of the dividend yield is 0.9650 and its
persistence φ is 0.7684.
r ∆d r ∆d
Panel I: 1927–2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b 0.267 0.039 0.175 0.034
[3.118] [0.624] [1.827] [0.474]




R2 0.107 0.005 0.151 0.005
b/(1− ρφ) 103% −15%
Panel II: 1945–2009
b 0.300 0.110 0.219 0.070
[3.445] [1.707] [2.352] [0.993]




R2 0.159 0.044 0.214 0.073
b/(1− ρφ) 116% −0.42%
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Figure 1: “Recession” in the News. The upper panel reports the occurrence of the word “recession”
in The New York Times and The Washington Post referring to the U.S., along with NBER business cycle
dates. The source of word counts is Factiva and the sample is 1980.1–2010.6. Black bars correspond to NBER
announcement dates. The lower panel reports the number of Google searches of the word “recession,” along
with NBER business cycle dates. These numbers do not represent absolute search volume numbers, because
data are normalized and presented on a scale from 0 to 100. The source is Google Insights and the sample
is 2004.1–2010.6.
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Figure 2: One-Year Realized U.S. Equity Sharpe Ratios Across Business Cycles. This figure plots
the conditional realized Sharpe ratio for one-year excess returns on U.S. equity during NBER recessions and
expansions. Investors buy m months after the start of an NBER recession (expansion) and hold for one year.
The diamonds correspond to recessions (left panel) and the squares to expansions (right panel). The sample
is 1945.1–2009.12. Vertical bars correspond to one standard error above and below point estimates.
35
